




Texas Military Department



**All-Hazards Conference
20 February 2026**

Exercise Rules

- This is **not** a brief. This is a **dialogue**. Slides are intended to facilitate discussion.
- Please silence electronic devices and step outside if you need to take a call.
- If a gap in support or planning flaw is discovered and cannot be readily resolved, it will be annotated by exercise staff and addressed in subsequent planning groups.
- Please signal the moderator if you have a question during the brief. When speaking, use the microphone and introduce yourself with your name, title, and agency.
- Please refrain from using acronyms as much as possible.

Agenda



Time	Event	Briefer
8:00-9:00 a.m.	Check-in & Breakfast	--
9:00-9:10 a.m.	Opening Comments	TAG/TDEM
9:10-9:20 a.m.	Exercise Introduction	DJS
9:20-9:30 a.m.	Exercise Objectives / TMD Capabilities	J35
9:30-9:45 a.m.	Scenario Introduction	J6
9:45-10:45 a.m.	Module 1: Incident	J35
10:45-11:00 a.m.	Break	--
11:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.	Module 2: Notification	J35
12:00-1:00 p.m.	Lunch	--
1:00-1:45 p.m.	Module 3: Muster	J35
1:45-2:00 p.m.	Break	--
2:00-2:45 p.m.	Module 4: Staging	J35
2:45-3:00 p.m.	Break	--
3:00-3:30 p.m.	Hotwash	J35
3:30-3:45 p.m.	Closing Comments	TDEM/TAG

Exercise Objectives & Methodology



Exercise Objective

Identify planning gaps and issues with our ability to execute core missions under degraded conditions and evaluate Texas Military Departments response/action to incidents in accordance with the All-Hazards response framework.

Primary Tasks for Audience

- 1. Discuss Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and partner agencies Continuity of Operations (COOP).
- 2. Conduct distributed mission command with unreliable communications.
- 3. Sustain forces with disrupted fuel supply chain.
- 4. Support simultaneous civil support requests in multiple major cities.

Exercise Methodology

The Facilitator presents the module then immediately begins leading a group discussion.

UNCLASSIFIED

Module 1: Incident
Friday, February 20, 2026 – Tuesday, February 24, 2026

At approximately 0500 CST, the DFW and Greater Austin (Austin / Round Rock / San Marcos) metropolitan areas experience a catastrophic, simultaneous loss of power generation and transmission capacity. Initial reports suggest a cyber incident. Restoration estimates are unavailable.

By Saturday, cascading effects are underway: wireless communication bandwidth has dropped noticeably, water treatment facilities are shutting down, and panic buying has begun. State agency assessments warn restoration could take weeks.

Key Issues

- Assessment of the potential scale, duration, and impact to TMD
- TMD Continuity of Operations (COOP)
- State agencies Continuity of Operations (COOP)
- Early decisions to posture TMD for possible response

D+0 to D+4 Impact Area Conditions	
Electric	No shore power
Cellular	Speed and capacity drop noticeably
Fuel	~75% of commercial stations rely on electricity for pumps to function and are offline. The remaining stations have fuel available and are experiencing long lines.
Food & Water	Panic buying begins in and around the incident area

Module 1: Incident
the damage and how should we initially respond?

COOP plan? How long to wait until execution? Who COOP's to where? Which echelons will you do not have new to COOP? Are you moving any steady-state or mission functions to a subordinate GC or fight in place as part of your COOP?

Person Officers (LNOs) be embedded at local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)?

specific personnel or MRPs?

They stay online without resupply?

at be activated to support your steady-state operations throughout the incident?


at shore power? What comes remain operational and how does this impact orders distribution and protection for during the incident? What manpower/resources will that require? Where will it come from?

Partner Agencies

1. What are the information requirements by priority? (TMD personnel and equipment, facility status, etc.)
2. What information do we need (population impact, infrastructure status, partner capabilities, etc.) to anticipate the scale and scope of potential missions and identify suitable RSOI and muster locations?
3. What actions, if any, are you taking currently? What are your continuity of operations plans?
4. What internal/contracted capabilities exist to react to this incident (PODs, LSAs, etc.)? Are there any significant gaps you would need TMD to fill?
5. When, if at all, would you request support from TMD to assist with critical infrastructure protection?
6. What are the triggers for a gubernatorial disaster declaration in response to a cyber-attack/power outage?
7. What (if any) Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) options are you requesting at this time?

The Facilitator summarizes the discussion and then transitions the group to the next module.

Scene Setter



TMD MSG:

OPERATIONAL ALERT WIDESPREAD INFRASTRUCTURE INCIDENT

1. (U) TMD IS TRACKING A WIDESPREAD INCIDENT AFFECTING SOME POWER, FUEL, AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS IN THE AUSTIN AND DALLAS METROPOLITAN AREAS.
2. (U) THE CAUSE, FULL SCALE, AND ESTIMATED DURATION OF THESE DISRUPTIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNKNOWN.
3. (U) ALL UNITS: BEGIN PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES VIA UNIT SOP. PREPARE MISSION READY PACKAGES FOR POTENTIAL ACTIVATION AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.
4. (U) TEXT MESSAGING IS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
5. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

Scenario Introduction



- Early this morning, a sophisticated and coordinated cyber event of unknown origin simultaneously targets critical infrastructure nodes serving the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) and Austin metroplexes. The event causes widespread power grid failures, which in turn trigger cascading disruptions across other essential sectors. The primary training objective is to force JFHQ-TX and Brigades to explore Continuity of Operations (COOP) capabilities while simultaneously directing response forces to conduct National Guard Civil Support (NGCS) in two major, non-contiguous urban areas under severely degraded conditions.
- **Day 0 (Friday, Feb 20):** Without warning, anomalous data patterns are detected in the digital control systems managing power distribution for the DFW and Austin regions. Within hours, automated load-balancing systems fail, leading to protective shutdowns and a rapid cascade of power failures.
- **Day 1-3 (Saturday, Feb 21 - Monday, Feb 23):** The initial power outage proves to be the catalyst for a systemic infrastructure crisis. The lack of reliable power and secondary impacts from the cyber event cripple communications, fuel distribution, water services, and electronic financial transactions. Local civil authorities, overwhelmed by the scope of the event, formally request TDEM support.
- **Day 4 (Tuesday, Feb 24):** The Governor issues a disaster declaration for the impacted counties.

Scenario Assumptions & Boundaries



Scenario Assumptions

- This exercise does not explore Texas infrastructure vulnerabilities or resiliencies. The power outage is a tool to explore TMD preparedness gaps in responding to a complicated incident.
- For purposes of exercise facilitation, the simulated degradation of essential sectors will be accelerated to enable discussion and decision-making.
- The exercise goal is to identify **operational-level** TMD all-hazard planning gaps – not to create a **tactical-level** operation order. We want more “I can’t self-sustain my brigade with local fuel – how can we get fuel distributed to me?” and less “where exactly would we set up a fuel point?”.
- TMD’s Cyber Mission Readiness Packages would be available to respond during this incident but will not be discussed after Module 1.

Scenario Boundaries

- This incident is a **criminal matter** and is believed to be perpetrated by a non-state actor.
- TMD will remain in Title 32 and/or State Active Duty status.
- The response will **NOT** involve any federal military action or support to Texas.
- Power restoration will take at least two weeks.
- Brigades will base decisions on real-time running estimates that reflect actual personnel availability and equipment readiness, not solely assigned strength.


Scenario Impacts



Sector	Description of Impact
Communications	Cellular and internet infrastructure is unreliable. Primary fiber-optic data routes become unstable, causing intermittent cellular service, dropped calls, and data transmission delays. FirstNet reliability is reduced under the strain of surge traffic. 911 call centers are quickly overwhelmed.
Fuel	Most fuel stations unable to operate fuel pumps. Without power, most fuel stations go offline due to an inability to pump and process electronic payments. The few stations that have backup power generation experience long lines and intermittent shutoffs as they wait for fuel resupply.
Water	Treatment facilities fail and “boil water” notices are issued. Widespread power outages cause water pumps and treatment facilities to fail. Loss of water pressure is reported in multiple municipalities. The failure of automated SCADA systems puts the safety of the water supply at risk, forcing a shift to manual operations.
Food	Widespread food shortages. The "just-in-time" food supply chain breaks down in the impacted area. Fuel shortages halt refrigerated trucks, while power outages at grocery stores lead to food spoilage. Supply chain delays result in empty shelves and food access issues, particularly in dense urban areas. Residents in the impact area begin migrating further out for supplies.
Points of Sale (PoS)	Electronic payment systems offline. Unstable communications and power grids cause widespread failures of electronic payment systems. Credit card readers, ATMs, and other electronic fund transfer (EFT) systems go offline. The economy is forced into a cash-only basis, but access to cash is limited by non-functional ATMs.
Public Safety	Emergency services overwhelmed and degraded. Local law enforcement, fire, and EMS face a crippling combination of unreliable communications, fuel shortages for vehicles, and an overwhelming volume of service calls. The failure of traffic signals leads to widespread gridlock, further hampering emergency vehicle movement.



Outage Heatmap



- Total Population: 9,357,563
- ATX Population: 2,138,485
- DFW Population: 7,219,078
DATA RECORDED 2022



Module 1: Incident

Friday, February 20, 2026 – Monday, February 23, 2026

At approximately 0500 CST, the DFW and Greater Austin (Austin / Round Rock / San Marcos) metropolitan areas experience a catastrophic, simultaneous loss of power generation and transmission capacity. Initial reports suggest a cyber incident. Restoration estimates are unavailable.

By Saturday, cascading effects are underway: wireless communication bandwidth has dropped noticeably, water treatment facilities are shutting down, and panic buying has begun. State agency assessments warn restoration could take weeks.

Key Issues

- Assessment of the potential scale, duration, and impact.
- TMD Continuity of Operations (COOP).
- State agencies Continuity of Operations (COOP).
- Early decisions to posture TMD for possible response.



D+0 to D+3 Impact Area Conditions	
Electric	No shore power.
Cellular	Speed and capacity drop noticeably.
Fuel	~75% of commercial stations rely on electricity for pumps to function and are offline. The remaining stations have fuel available and are experiencing long lines.
Food & Water	Panic buying begins in and around the incident area.



Module 1: Incident

What is the extent of the damage and how should we initially respond?

Partner Agencies

1. What actions, if any, are you taking currently? What are your Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans?
2. What internal/contracted capabilities exist to react to this incident (PODs, LSAs, etc.)? Are there any significant gaps you would need TMD to fill?
3. When, if at all, would you request support from TMD to assist with critical infrastructure protection?
4. What are the triggers for the Governor to issue a disaster declaration for the impacted counties?
5. What (if any) Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) options are you requesting at this time?

Command & Control

1. What is the trigger to initiate COOP plans? How long to wait until execution? Who COOPs to where? Which echelons will you require to COOP? What resources are needed that you do not have now to COOP? Are you moving any steady-state or mission functions to a subordinate while you COOP? What is your decision point to jump TOC or fight in place as part of your COOP? What is the PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) communications plan?
2. How early should Military District Coordinator (MDC) Liaison Officers (LNOs) be embedded at local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)?

Movement & Maneuver

1. What (if any) standing orders should TMD implement for specific personnel or MRPs?

Sustainment

1. What TMD facilities have backup power? How long can they stay online without resupply?
2. What (if any) sustainment personnel or formations should be activated to support your steady-state operations throughout the incident?
3. What TMD communications infrastructure is dependent on shore power? What comms remain operational and how does this impact orders distribution and running estimates during the incident?

Protection

1. What critical TMD assets are you considering additional protection for during the incident? What manpower/resources will that require? Where will it come from and what would you need from your higher headquarters?

Incident Awareness & Assessment

1. What are the information requirements by priority? (TMD personnel and equipment, availability, facility status, etc.)
2. What information do we need (population impact, infrastructure status, partner capabilities, etc.) to anticipate the scale and scope of potential missions and identify suitable staging and muster locations?



Module 2: Notification

Tuesday, February 24, 2026 – Wednesday, February 25, 2026

Tuesday morning, the Governor issues an emergency declaration for the affected counties. In response to local EOC requests, the SOC publishes a State of Texas Assistance Request (STAR) for TMD to activate elements of Joint Task Force – Texas with a be prepared to mission to provide points of distribution (PODs) and security assistance to law enforcement.

Key Issues

- Early warning orders and notification processes must function despite degraded networks.
- Operation Lone Star response capabilities and decision points.
- Initial capability requests from local officials may exceed force availability.



D+4 to D+5 Impact Area Conditions	
Electric	No shore power.
Cellular	Service degrades to basic voice & text.
Fuel	~75% of commercial stations rely on electricity for pumps to function and are offline. The remaining stations have fuel available and are experiencing long lines.
Food & Water	Stores close that do not have backup power. Residents in the impact area begin searching for stores outside of the impact area for supplies.



Module 2: Notification

Considering the degradation of essential sectors, what capabilities remain to respond?

Partner Agencies

1. What actions, if any, are you taking currently?
2. What, if any, MRPs or resources from TMD would be requested at this time?
3. What are your state agency essential functions during this incident?
4. What indicators that you measure would suggest that your agency would require more support than Joint Task Force – Texas can provide?

Command & Control

1. How does the JOC communicate orders if primary comms have degraded?
2. What, if any, orders will your HQs publish immediately via a verbal order vs. written order?
3. What are the triggers to utilize OLS as a rapid response element while other units muster and move into the area of operations?

Movement & Maneuver

1. What is the criteria to exempt service members from activation? How many GSUs, GTPs, etc. (in addition to Joint Task Force – TX assignments) can your formations provide given these exemptions?
2. Where should service members be directed to report? Home-station armory? Staging location? Partner agency facilities or alternate sites?

Sustainment

1. How do we forecast sustainment requirements for diverse mission types (distribution/PODS, security, etc.)?
2. What resource and commodity running estimates need to be kept at which levels? (fuel stations open, days of supply on hand, etc.)

Protection

1. What (if any) assistance from DPS or local law enforcement do you need for facility protection? What TMD element(s) is responsible for that coordination?

Incident Awareness & Assessment

1. What evolving indicators (population movement, infrastructure collapse, civil unrest) might shift mission priorities during this phase?



Module 3: Muster

Thursday, February 26, 2026 – Saturday, February 28, 2026

TMD service members begin mustering, many navigating non-functional traffic control systems, fuel scarcity, and congested routes.

All TMD facilities in the incident areas continue to have no shore power or water, and limited comms.

Key Issues

- Prioritizing mission essential functions.
- Sequencing decisions – which forces move first and to where – will directly shape early mission success.
- Sustaining personnel and equipment during extended muster windows becomes a critical challenge.



D+6 to D+8 Impact Area Conditions	
Electric	No shore power.
Cellular	Basic voice and text.
Fuel	~75% of commercial stations rely on electricity for pumps to function and are offline. The remaining stations have fuel available and are experiencing long lines.
Food & Water	Local stores remain closed and residents in impact area continue traveling outside of impact area for supplies.

Module 3: Muster



How do we balance operational requirements, overcome infrastructure failures, and sequence decisions so that the right people show up at the right time at the right place?

Partner Agencies

1. What actions, if any, are you taking currently?
2. What support from TMD do you require to maintain your agency essential functions?
3. What is the trigger for your agency to move from centralized command and control to de-centralized (i.e. regions)?

Command & Control

1. Who must maintain communications with muster locations? What systems are available without shore power?
2. Who has command and control of elements being mustered? Is this decentralized or centralized?
3. Is there any way to reduce muster requirements (i.e. administrative requirements) to reduce response time?
4. What is the required equipment and personnel to muster to facilitate Continuity of Operations (COOP)?
5. What level of accountability is required before authorizing deployment if mission specifics remain undefined?

Movement & Maneuver

1. What percentage of your formations do you expect to be available to muster within 72 hours?
2. How long will it take to muster? (~40% are more than 100 miles to their assigned unit).
3. How do we sequence force packages to maximize flexibility – ensuring the right mix of security, sustainment, and logistics capabilities move forward first?

Sustainment

1. What commodities, fuel, ammunition, and equipment should be distributed and to where at this phase?
2. How long can muster be sustained before resupply is required? What resources and formations are required to conduct resupply?

Protection

1. How do we secure personnel, vehicles, and muster areas during this phase?
2. Should law enforcement assistance for movement to staging be considered during this phase? Who is responsible for coordinating outside TMD for it (if applicable)?

Incident Awareness & Assessment

1. What situational awareness is required to understand force posture, staging progress, route conditions, and emerging mission needs during muster?



Module 4: Staging

Sunday, March 01, 2026 – Monday, March 02, 2026

Subsequent STARs and action requests with specific missions are sent to TMD while units begin to arrive at staging sites. The STARs have varying levels of urgency and mission requirements that include support to law enforcement and POD operations.

All TMD facilities in the incident areas continue to have no shore power, water, or connectivity.

Key Issues

- Movement control and staging operations must synchronize with supported agency timelines and priorities.
- Units must remain agile and ready to redirect without degrading operational tempo.
- Forward sustainment, communications nodes, and command elements must be pre-positioned to support dynamic operations.



D+9 to D+10 Impact Area Conditions	
Electric	No shore power.
Cellular	Basic voice and text.
Fuel	~75% of commercial stations rely on electricity for pumps to function and are offline. The remaining stations have fuel available and are experiencing long lines.
Food & Water	Local stores remain closed and residents in impact area continue traveling outside of impact area for supplies.



Module 4: Staging

How do we synchronize operations to respond to a rapidly evolving situation?

Partner Agencies

1. What actions, if any, are you taking currently?
2. Assuming there is no further degradation, when do you anticipate to no longer require additional TMD support?

Command & Control

1. How are communications maintained with units as they move from muster locations to staging location? At staging site?
2. How do we ensure command and control agility to redirect or re-task units as requirements change or are clarified with degraded comms.
3. What options are there to reduce the staging requirement to reduce response time?
4. Does there need to be a central staging site?

Movement & Maneuver

1. How do units move from muster location to staging location?
2. How do we prioritize mission locations if simultaneous mission demands (e.g., security vs distribution) exceed current capacity?
3. What equipment should be brought to staging? All assigned equipment? Limited to MRP requirements?

Sustainment

1. What commodities, fuel, ammunition, and equipment should be distributed and to where at this phase?
2. How long can staging be sustained before resupply is required? What resources and formations are required to conduct resupply?

Protection

1. What security requirements are required at staging locations?
2. Should convoy protection be considered at this phase?

Incident Awareness & Assessment

1. What are information requirements (i.e. infrastructure, routes, and civil conditions) during this phase?



Exercise Hotwash and After-Action Survey

Hotwash

Who: Players (Required). All others optional.

What: Evaluate TMD’s incident readiness as observed during the AHC.



After-Action Survey

Who: Everyone.

What: Evaluate the effectiveness of the All-Hazard’s Conference.




Exercise AAR

Will be completed by exercise staff and distributed to TMD leadership and key partners.



All Hazards Conference Way Ahead



Less-to-More Involved Exercise

Less-to-More Complex Hazard

Hazard		Discussion-Based Exercises				Operations-Based Exercises		
		Seminar	Workshop	Table Top Exercise	Game	Drill	Functional Exercise	Full Scale Exercise
	Winter Weather CDO Flooding Fire	Proficient						
	Power Loss		'28	'26		'29		
	Hurricane			'27	'29			
	Homeland Defense		'27	'28				

TMD does not have a current Integrated Preparedness Plan and, historically, All Hazards ROCs have only focused on hurricane responses. The HSEEP framework can be used during the annual All Hazards Conference (the 'new' AHROC) to build out an IPP and evaluate TMD response readiness.

A silhouette of a soldier in full combat gear, including a helmet and a rifle slung over their shoulder, stands against a dramatic, cloudy sky. The soldier is positioned in the center-left of the frame, facing right. The overall tone is somber and heroic.

DUTY

BEAR TRUE FAITH & ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE AND NATION. CULTIVATE AN ENVIRONMENT FOR ALL TO EXCEL. PREPARE MENTALLY, PHYSICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY TO DEPLOY AT HOME AND ABROAD. BE READY WHEN CALLED.

HONOR

HOLD THE PUBLIC TRUST IN THE HIGHEST REGARD, EXCEED STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS. ACT WITH UNDERSTANDING, INNOVATION, RESOURCEFULNESS, FLEXIBILITY AND URGENCY. DO ALL YOU CAN, WHERE YOU ARE, WITH WHAT YOU HAVE & ALWAYS PLACE THE WELFARE OF THOSE YOU LEAD FIRST.

TEXAS

EMBRACE THE COURAGEOUS SPIRIT OF OUR PEOPLE, HISTORY & CULTURE.